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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA ZITO, I 
Plaintiff and I 
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I 
vs. Case No. U4t3 
I 
GARY BUTLER, 
I 
Defendant and 
Appellant. I 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA ZITO, I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
Case No. 15493 
GARY BUTLER, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action in paternity brought by the Respondent 
against the Appellant, wherein the Respondent sought to obtain 
a Judgment finding the Appellant as the natural father of Shauna 
Zito, for reasonable expenses of Respondent, for past support, 
for future support, and for attorney's fees. 
The Appellant filed an Answer alleging the affirmative 
defenses of statute of limitations, laches, waiver, and estoppel 
resulting from Respondent's failure to initiate this action 
seeking declaration of paternity against the Appellant. 
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Appellant seeks a determination as to whether or not 
the affirmative defenses of !aches, waiver, and estoppel are 
permissible to the Respondent's Petition for a Declaration 
of Paternity, and for child support. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court from a jury verdict in favor of the 
Respondent in its action for a Declaration of Paternity and 
for past and future child support, declared the Appellant to 
be the father of the minor child, and to remit the amount of 
past child support due and owing to the Respondent. 
The Lower Court did further make an Order setting forth 
the amount of child support the Appellant would be required 
to pay to the Respondent on behalf of said minor child in the 
future. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment and final Order 
of the Lower Court, which denied to the Appellant the right 
to assert the affirmative defenses of the statute of limitations, 
!aches, waiver, and estoppel at time of trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
---
The Respondent commenced an action on or about February 18, 
1976, seeking a declaration against the Appellant as the putative 
-2-
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father of the minor child, Shauna Zito, born to the Respondent 
on September 2, 1971. (R-1) 
The Appellant filed an Answer to the Respondent's Petition 
on or about March 12, 1976, wherein the Appellant did set forth 
the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations, the 
affirmative defense of laches, the affirmative defense of estoppel, 
in addition to denying paternity. (R-4,-5) 
The Appellant did file a Motion for Summary Judgment 
on or about April 10, 1976, alleging that the affirmative defenses 
set forth in Appellant's Answer was dispositive of the issues 
before the Lower Court (R-10). The Honorable Calvin Gould 
denied the Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment in a Memorandum 
Decision dated June 4, 1976, holding that the issue of paternity 
could be determined where the Respondent had commenced an action 
more then four years after the birth of the minor child. (R-
23) 
The matter came on regularly for trial on October 5, 
1977, before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Judge, sitting 
with a jury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WAS ERROR. 
The Honorable Calvin Gould did render a Memorandum 
-3-
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Decision on or about June 4, 1976, wherein he denied the Plaintiff' 
Motion for Summary Judgment stating an issue of paternity may 
be determined in this action. 
The Supreme Court of Utah held that the passage of the 
Uniform Act on Paternity did not supersede nor impliedly repeal 
the Utah Bastardy Act, U.C.A., 1953, 77-60-1, et seq., in~ 
of Utah v. Abram, 495 P.2d 313 (Ut., 1972). It, therefore, 
appears that there are two methods whereby a mother of an illegiti· 
mate child may seek a declaration of paternity and child support 
from the child's alleged natural father. 
This Court also held in State of Utah v. Judd, 493 P.2d 
604 (Ut., 1972), that the Bastardy Act and the Uniform Act 
on Paternity are substantially the same, except for the manner 
in which the proceedings are initiated. 
This Court further stated in the Judd case, that: 
It appears therefrom an express intention upon the 
part of the legislature to retain the Bastardy Act, 
and there is no justification for determination, that 
the legislature intended to repeal the earlier Act •.. 
It is a rule of statutory construction, that where 
there are two or more statutes dealing with the 
same subject matter, they will be construed so as 
to maintain the integrity of both. Repeal by impli-
cation is not affected unless the terms of the later 
enacted law are irreconcilable with the former. (Cit-
ing McCoy v. Severson, 222 P.2d 1058 (Ut., 1950). 
The Bastardy Act, U.C.A., 1953, 77-60-15, provides that 
no prosecution under this chapter shall be brought after four 
-4-
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years from the birth of such child. The Uniform Act on 
Paternity, U.C.A., 78-45A-l, et seq., does not set forth any 
statute of limitations upon which an action may be commenced, 
but, it does, however, provide in U.C.A., 78-45A-3, that a 
father's liability for past education and necessary support 
is limited to the four years next preceding the commencement 
of an action. 
Therefore, it appears in following the Utah Supreme 
Court's rule of statutory construction as pronounced in State v. 
Judd, supra, where there are two statutes which relate to the 
same subject matter, as is true in the instant case, the 
Court will construe such statutes in a manner maintaining the 
integrity of both. The similarity of the Bastardy Act and 
Uniform Act on Paternity has been acknowledged in State v. 
Judd, supra, and Brown v. Marrelli, 527 P.2d 230 (Ut., 1974). 
The two Acts being alternative remedies, involving like 
subject matter, both the Bastardy Act and the Uniform Act on 
Paternity should be given effect so long as the two Acts are 
not irreconcilable. 
In Re People In Interest of L.B., 498 P.2d 1157 (Colo., 
1972), the Colorado Supreme Court held where there is a specific 
statute setting forth a statute of limitations for paternity, 
that the issue of paternity cannot be adjudicated "as an adjunct" 
-5-
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of support proceedings where support proceedings are not commenced 
within the five-year (paternity) statute of limitations. 
The Appellant submits that since the Utah Bastardy Act 
provides a four-year statute of limitations from the date of 
birth of the child and the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity provides 
that recovery from the father is limited to the four years 
next preceding the commencement of an action, the two Acts 
can be construed so as to maintain the integrity of both statutes 
by applying the four-year statute of limitations in actions 
brought under both Acts and by permitting the party seeking 
a declaration of paternity to recovery for past education and 
necessary support to the four years next preceding the commencement 
of the action, (a remedy not afforded under the Bastardy Act). 
The Appellant distinguishes the present case from the 
holding of this Court in Martinez v. Romero, 558 P.2d 510 (Ut., 
1976), wherein the issue presented to the Court was whether 
an action could be commenced pursuant to U.C.A., 78-45A-l and 
~. for past support and confinement and also an Order for future 
support to be sought under the Uniform Act on Paternity more 
then eight years after the birth of the child. 
It appears to the Appellant that the Utah Supreme Court 
therein held, that an action not brought within eight years 
is barred by U.C.A., 78-12-22. 
That U.C.A., 78-12-22, provides that: 
-6-
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78-12-22. Within eight years - Within eight years: 
Any action to enforce any liability due or to become 
due, for failure to provide support or maintenance 
for dependent children. 
That U.C.A., 78-12-22, sets forth a statute of limita-
tion which is more specifically referred to in U.C.A., 78-12-
!' which provides that: 
78-12-1. Time for Conunencement of Action 
Generally - Civil actions can be conunenced only 
within the period prescribed in this chapter, 
after the cause of action shall have accrued, 
except where in special cases a different limita-
tion is prescribed by statute. 
This Court held in Seeley v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Ut., 
1975), that the eight-year limitation of U.C.A., 78-12-22, 
applied to past due alimony and support. 
However, the holdings of Seeley v. Park, supra, and 
Martinez v. Romero, supra, are distinguishable from the instant 
case, in that Seeley v. Park concerned child support pursuant 
to a Decree of Divorce and Martinez v. Romero only presented 
the issue, that a paternity action could not be conunenced more 
then eight years after the birth of the child under the Uniform 
Act on Paternity and did not consider the affect of U.C.A., 
78-12-1, on u.c.A., 78-12-22, in that such a consideration 
was unnecessary under the facts of that case. 
It is submitted, that U.C.A., 77-60-15, which sets forth 
a four-year statute of limitations issue is within the "special 
cases" of u.c.A., 78-12-1, and precludes the Respondent from 
-7-
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proceeding against the Appellant in an action seeking a declaratio:. 
of paternity more then four years after the birth of the child. 
POINT II 
REFUSAL OF COURT TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS AFTER RESPONDENT HAD RESTED HIS CASE IS 
ERROR. 
That the Appellant, upon the Respondent resting his 
case, made a Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the Respondent 
had failed to set forth a prima facie case, in that there was 
no showing as to the gestation period and no showing as to 
when the Respondent did become pregnant (R-181,-182). 
That while it does appear from the testimony of the 
Respondent, that Respondent was engaging in a sexual relationship 
with the Defendant in November, December of 1970, and January 
of 1971, and the Respondent further testified that: 
Q. I see. Now, did there come a time, Barbara, when 
you discovered that you were pregnant or you 
thought you might be pregnant. 
A. Yes. 
Q. But when was that? 
A. Probably in about January. (R-153) 
The Respondent did further testify that she consulted 
a doctor around the 1st of March, 1971, and the Respondent 
was permitted over the objection of the Appellant to testify 
as to the results of the doctor's examination and that the 
Respondent was pregnant at that time. (R-154) 
-8-
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That the Lower Court erred in admitting such unsupported 
evidence, and said that: 
The Court: She may answer the question if the answer 
was given in the course of ordinary treatment. 
That the Rules of Evidence as adopted by the Supreme 
Court of Utah, and particularly Rules 62 and 63, which define 
"hearsay" and the exceptions thereto, do not set forth an exception 
for treatments made during the course of ordinary treatment. 
The California Supreme Court in Smith v. Heilman, 340 
P.2d 752 (Cal., 1959), stated that: 
As above stated, in the present case the period of 
gestation was 188 or 190 days. 
In Dazey y. Dazey 50 Cal.App.2d 15, at page 20, 122 
P.2d 308 [at. ;:iug 310], it was said in referring to a medical 
text book, that: 
"'It is customery to recognize a length of pregnancy 
as nine calendar months, or ten lunar months, 280 
days duration, dating from the first day of the last 
menstruil.tion period.'" 
It was also said therein, 50 Cal.App.2d at page 20, 
122 P.2d at page 310, that: 
This author also plainly states, that if we compute 
the period from fruitful coition to birth, [period 
gestation] there is from 220 days to 330 days. 
The attending physician, called as a witness by 
Defendant, testified that, in determining a date 
when a child will be born, the members of the 
medical profession count 280 days from the last 
menstrual period, but if they could actually know 
the date of fruitful coition, they would count 
-9-
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the time of delivery from that date; that there 
is no cognizable in the medical profession, that 
the period of pregnancy range from 220 to 330 
days; that there is no hard and fast rule limiting 
the periods of pregnancy; that he would not consider 
it an average case if a child were born 190 days 
after fruitful coition, but he would not say 
that it was an abnormal case. 
Therefore, it is submitted that without testimony as 
to when the Respondent became pregnant and that she only suspected 
being pregnant in January, 1971, and the gestation period in 
this particular instance not being shown, the Appellant's Motion 
to Dismiss should have been granted, in that the jury would 
be required to speculate as to when the Respondent did become 
pregnant and such speculation should not be permitted where 
the Respondent could have produced testimony establishing the 
date of impregnation and that such impregnation did occur in 
November or December of 1970 and/or January 1971, those being 
the months the Respondent testified having sexual intercourse 
with the Appellant. (R-152,-153) 
POINT III 
THE REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO INSTRUCT JURORS ON 
LACHES AND ESTOPPEL IS ERROR. 
The Defendant requested three jury instructions concerning 
the defenses of laches, estoppel, and waiver, and the Court 
refused such instructions as submitted by the Defendant. (R-
218) 
-10-
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The jury instructions on laches, estoppel, and waiver 
(R-89,-90,-91), are proper instructions and should have been 
submitted to the jury on the basis of the testimony of the 
Respondent, wherein the Respondent stated that: 
Q. Okay. Mrs. Zito, after receiving this letter, 
no further action was taken, was it? 
A. No, there was not. 
Q. That was the end of the proceedings there, wasn't 
it? 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. You elected at that time not to proceed, didn't 
you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You knew at that time you had the right to go 
after him, though. 
A. You bet I did. 
Q. For the same thing you are going after him for 
right now, didn't you. 
A. Uh huh. (R-173) 
The letter which is being referred to above is the letter 
written to Attorney Findley P. Gridley who was representing 
the Respondent in September, 1972, and this letter is the reply 
to the communication from Attorney Gridley to the Appellant 
seeking a declaration of paterntiy by the Appellant for the 
minor child. (Def.Exh.6) 
It is submitted that the testimony of the Respondent 
-11-
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was such that the failure of the Court to instruct the jury 
on the defenses of laches, waiver, and estoppel was error, 
and that such defenses should have been submitted to the jury. 
That the Supreme Court of Washington held in Buell v. 
City of Bremerton, 495 P.2d 1358 (Wash., 1972), that: 
The element of laches are: (1) knowledge of 
reasonable opportunity to discover on the part 
of a potential Plaintiff, that he has a cause 
of action against the Defendant; (2) An 
unreasonable delay by the Plaintiff in commenc-
ing that cause of action; (3) Damage to the 
Defendant resulting from the unreasonable 
delay. None of these elements alone raises 
the defense of laches. Laches is an impl-
ted waiver arising from knowledge of existing 
conditions and acquiescence in them. 
Similarly, in Hanns v. Hanns, 423 P.2d 499 (Ore., 1967), 
the Oregon Supreme Court held, that laches is neglect for unreason·[ 
able and unexplained length of time under circumstances which 
would permit diligence to do in law what should have been done 
and which results in a disadvantage to the other party. 
The Appellant testified, that had the Respondent proceeded 
in September or October of 1972, that his recollection as to 
dates and places concerning the paternity charge would be better. 
(R-188) Therefore, it is submitted that the long delay of 
the Respondent, when said Respondent knew that a proceeding 
could be instituted against the Appellant herein, resulted 
in a detriment to the Appellant, in that his ability to recollect 
dates and places diminished, and that the failure of the Responder. 
-12-
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to proceed on her claim in 1972 constitutes laches and the 
Respondent should be estopped from now proceadi~g ~gainst tQe 
Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that the statute 
of limitations barred the Respondent from proceeding against 
the Appellant for a declaration of paternity, in that more 
than four years have elapsed from the child•s birth until the 
action was commenced. 
It is further submitted, that the Trial Court erred , 
in not granting the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss, in permitting 
the Respondent to testify to matters which do not fall within 
the hearsay exception, and refusing to instruct the jury as 
to the defenses of laches, estoppel, and waiver in light of 
the testimony received by the Court. 
Respectfully submitted this 17 day of January, 1978. 
~~ e'N. Vla~  
Attorney for Appellant 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogd Utah 8440 
~£ tc/,~ 
onald w. Perkins 
Attorney for Appellant 
Legal Forum Bumlding 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
A copy of the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant 
was posted in the U.S. mail postage prepaid and addressed 
to the Attorney for the Respondent, Francis M. Wikstrom, 
9 Bank of Utah Plaza, Ogden, Utah 84401, on this ~day 
of January, 1978. 
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